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RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT PAROLE RELEASE HEARINGS
Menechino v. Oswald
430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970)
Menechino, following revocation of his parole, appeared twice before
the Board of Parole for reconsideration of his parole release; release
was denied on both occasions.' Under New York Parole Board rules and
regulations, assistance of counsel at the release hearing was expressly
prohibited. 2 Appellant sought a declaratory judgment in federal court3
that he was entitled to assistance of retained counsel at his parole release
hearing as a minimum requirement of procedural due process.' The
district court granted summary judgment dismissing the petition.' On
appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, held: the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment does not foreclose excluding
retained counsel at parole release hearings.6
A. Prerequisites for Requiring Procedural Due Process
The majority in Menechino considered three prerequisites to the
imposition of procedural due process protections: an adversary
proceeding requiring the traditional skills of counsel;7 the existence of
a private interest presently enjoyed by the complaining party;8 and an
acceptable administrative burden placed upon the state.? The majority
1. Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 404 (2d Cir. 1970).
2. 9 N.Y. CODE OF RuLEs & RE(. § 155.9.
Attendance at hearings. Neither the inmate's attorney nor any other party will be permitted
to attend or speak in person in the inmate's behalf or against him at any meeting of the
Board of Parole at which the inmate's release on parole is being considered. The board
shall have complete discretion with respect to the presence of any other persons at such
hearings.
430 F.2d at 406, 413.
3. Jurisdiction invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(3), 1361 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Supp. 1971), 430 F.2d at 404.
4. Appellant specifically claimed he was entitled to:
"... (i) notice of charges including a substantial summary of the evidence and reports
before the Board, (ii) a fair hearing, including the right of counsel, to cross-examination
and confrontation and to present favorable evidence and compel the specification of the
grounds and underlying facts upon which the determination is based .
430 F.2d at 405.
5. Menechino v. Oswald, 311 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
6. 430 F.2d at 403. Appellant's prior claims to right to counsel at his parole revocation hearing
were also denied: In re Menechino, 57 Misc. 2d 865, 293 N.Y.S.2d 741 (Sup. Ct. Special Term
1968), rev'd, 301 N.Y.S.2d 350 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1969).
7. 430 F.2d at 407-08.
8. Id. at408.
9. Id. at 409-10.
Washington University Open Scholarship
COUNSEL AT PAROLE HEARINGS
implicitly accepted the arguments that these three elements do not exist
at a parole release hearing.
The majority began with the premise that the Board of Parole is not
the prisoner's adversary:
On the contrary the Board has an identity of interest with him to the
extent that it is seeking to encourage and foster his rehabilitation and
readjustment to society. 10
Apparently no evidence was presented to establish that the practice of
the Board created an adversary atmosphere. The court pointed out that
the Board was not normally called upon to resolve disputed issues of
fact, but rather to weigh medical, psychiatric, criminological,
penological and human relation considerations." Since the proceeding
did not involve charges or accusations, the court concluded that the
proceeding was not adversary in nature and, therefore, did not require
the traditional skills of counsel. 2
Next, although recognizing the prisoner's interest in liberty, the
majority found missing the existence of a "private interest enjoyed 13 by
the prisoner." Relying upon Justice Cardozo's dictum in Escoe v.
Zerbst,4 the court echoed the traditional view that parole is not a right
but a matter of grace,' 5 and likened a parole petitioner to an alien seeking
entry into the United States. 16
Finally the majority concluded an unacceptable administrative burden
would be placed on the state if assistance of counsel were allowed. This
conclusion was based upon four interrelated factors: (1) the large volume
of parole release hearings in the state; (2) a concern that assistance of
10. Id. at 407.
11. Id. at 408.
12. Id. at 407-08.
13. Id. at 408.
14. 295 U.S. 490 (1935).
15. "[P]robation or suspension of sentence comes as an act of grace to one convicted of a crime,
and may be coupled with such conditions or respect of its duration as the legislature may impose."
Id. at 492-93.
16. 430 F.2d at 408-09. The court specifically found release on parole is more a "privilege"
than a "right" and the Board is given absolute discretion in instituting release proceeding and
possible granting of parole. As such the prisoner is "[]ike an alien seeking entry into the United
States . . . he does not qualify for procedural due process in seeking parole". The majority's
comparison of prisoners to aliens is similar to the outdated "slave of the state" doctrine. Although
prisoners were once considered "slaves of the state", Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt)
790, 796 (1871), this concept is now rejected, Coffin v. Reichard, 145 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 887 (1945). See generally Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners:
The Developing Law, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 985 (1962).
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counsel "would be followed by demands by appellant and others for
the full panoply of procedural rights";1 7 (3) the resulting clogged
calendars for hearings before the Board; s and (4) a possible requirement
that counsel be appointed for indigent prisoners.
A critical evaluation of the majority's treatment of the due process
issue necessitates a consideration of the following problems. First, in
considering the adversary nature of parole proceeding and need for
counsel, it should be recognized that even in a classical adversary
proceeding, e.g., criminal trial, many "non-factual" issues arise
requiring assistance of counsel."9 An example of this is the testimony
of expert witnesses. Questions of scientific fact are never purely questions
of fact but often require the opinions of the observer to put the
observations into a meaningful context. Counsel's role in these situations
can be viewed as establishing a reasonable doubt that the opinions of
the experts are correct. This could be easily applied to medical and social
examiners at parole hearings also. 0
More importantly the need for counsel has been recognized at pro-
ceedings not traditionally viewed as adversary.2' For example, counsel
is required during certain phases of a juvenile proceeding. 2 Actually the
majority's comparison of the Parole Board to the petitioner's parents13
17. 430 F.2d at412.
... [W]e have no doubt that this [right to counsel] would be followed by demands (by
appellant or others) for the full panoply of procedural rights demanded in the complaint,
including cross-examination of doctors, psychiatrists, case workers, prison officials, and
the like. We believe that to embark upon such a course would be unwise. (Emphasis added).
Such action could severely interfere with personal and subjective elements necessary for the Parole
Board's decision, see N.Y. CORR. L. § 214 (4)(McKinney 1968)(Prisoner's attitude toward society,
judge, district attorney, policemen, crime for which imprisoned in addition to mental and
psychiatric evidence). See also Dawson, The Decision to Grant or Deny Parole: A Study of Parole
Criteria in Law and Practice, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 243, 299; Note, Due Process: The Right to
Counsel in Parole Release Hearings, 54 IowA L. REV. 497, 507-09 (1968).
18. 430 F.2d at410.
19. See note II supra and accompanying text.
20. Another non-factual context in an adversary proceeding requiring assistance of counsel is
the numerous motions involving legal issues. Of course by definition this indicates a need for and
requirement for legal counsel.
21. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (revocation of welfare benefits); Shone v. Maine,
406 F.2d 844 (1st Cir.), vacated as moot, 396 U.S. 6 (1969)(juvenile offenders being transferred
from boys' training center to men's correctional institution); United States ex rel. Schuster v.
Herald, 410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir. 1969) (transferring prisoner to state institution for insane prisoners);
Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (1970) affd in part sub nom, Sostre v. McGinnis, 442
F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 197 l)(placing in solitary confinement for more than a year).
22. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
23. 430 F.2d at 407. "Here we do not have pursurer and quarry but a relationship partaking
of parens patriae. In a real sense the Parole Board . ..occupies the role of parent withholding
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is strikingly similar to the parens patriae theory once used in denying
assistance of counsel to juveniles. 24
Second, although foreclosing procedural due process protections by
classifying parole release as a privilege has received substantial judicial
support,2 5 the theory's validity was destroyed" in Goldberg v. Kelly 2.
There the Supreme Court stated:
• ..the constitutional challenge cannot be answered by an argument that
[a party's interest] is a privilege and not a right. . . .The extent to which
procedural due process must be afforded . . . depends upon whether the
recipient's interest . . . outweighs the governmental interest in summary
adjudication. 21
This statement indicates two things: as the dissent in Menechino
suggests, what is of primary importance is not the present enjoyment
but the nature of the interest,29 and the determination of whether
procedural due process is required must be made by balancing the
interests of the individual and the government. 31 If the privilege v. right
a privilege from an errant child. ... quoting Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger in Hyser v.
Reed, 318 F.2d 225, cert. denied sub noma, Thompson v. United States Board of Parole, 375 U.S.
957 (1963).
24. See, e.g., White v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1954).
25. In supporting its conclusion that a prisoner is not entitled to counsel at a parole release
hearing as a matter of constitutional right, the court cited: Mead v. California Adult Authority,
415 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1969); Williams v. Patterson, 389 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1968); Hodge v.
Markley, 339 F.2d 973 (7th Cir. 1965); Jones v. Rivers, 338 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1964); Rose v.
Haskins, 388 F.2d 91 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 946 (1964); Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225,
cert. denied sub nom, Thompson v. United States Board of Parole, 375 U.S. 957 (1963);
Washington v. Hagan, 287 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 970 (1961). See also
Briguglio v. New York State Board of Parole, 24 N.Y. 2d 21, 246 N.E.2d 512, 298 N.Y.S.2d
704 (1969); People ex rel. Ochs v. LaVallee, 60 Misc.2d 629, 303 N.Y.S.2d 774 (1969).
26. See Hewett v. North Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316, 1322-23 (1969); Van Alstype, The Demise
of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968). Also
under statutes such as the Model Penal Code, it is possible to argue that release on parole is a
right. Model Penal Code §§ 305.6, 305.9 (Proposed Official Draft 1962), 305.6 ("Every prisoner
sentenced to an indefinite term . . . shall be eligible for release on parole upon completion of his
minimum term . . .") and 305.9(l) ("Whenever the Board of Parole considers the first release
of a prisoner who is eligible for release on parole, it shall be the policy of the Board to order his
release, unless .. ") (emphasis added).
27. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
28. Id. at 262-63.
29. 430 F.2d at 418-19. See also 397 U.S. at 266-67.
30. Due process is an elusive and flexible concept. Based upon the principal that governmental
power is potentially destructive to the conditions inherent to a free society, certain actions are
constitutionally proscribed. Beyond this concept, however, is the recognition that improper exercise
of otherwise appropriate governmental powers is also potentially destructive. Kadish, Methodology
and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 340-41
(1957) [hereinafter cited as Kadish]. This recognition necessitates the regulation of governmental
Vol. 1971:502]
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1971/iss3/9
506 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1971:502
distinction is discarded, it is apparent that the prisoner has an interest
in his return to society. This could be balanced against the government's
interest in maintaining an acceptable administrative burden. 31
Third, in assessing the administrative burden that would be placed
upon the state if assistance of counsel were permitted, it is necessary
to examine how different states have responded to the problem. Several
states allow assistance of counsel through either legislation or Parole
Board Regulation. 32 There is no evidence that the parole release process
in these states has been adversely affected.3 No sound conclusion can
actions through procedural safeguards to insure a "fundamental concept of fairness", Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934); 15 KAN. L. REv.
374, 377 (1967); the basic issue, therefoe, is what attenuation of "traditional procedures" is
acceptable in the proceedings at hand so as to remain consistent with this fundamental concept
of fairness. Professor Sanford H. Kadish has suggested a three step analysis of this question
focusing on the following areas:
1. the impact upon the personal life of the individual as to whom [the decision] is made;
2. justification for attenuation in terms of the values it purports to further and the
indispensability of the attenuated procedures in furthering these objectives;
3. effect upon society when procedures fall short of the reliability insured by traditional
procedures.
Kadish, 350. See also 15 KAN. L. REv. 374, 378-79 (1967). A similar analysis was followed
by the Supreme Court in Goldberg: "consideration of what procedures due process may require
under a given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the
government function involved as well as the private interest that has been affected by governmental
action." 397 U.S. at 263. Such analysis indicates a balancing of interests-those of the individual
on one side against those of the government government which are furthered attenuated proceedings
on the other. The propriety of this inquiry should not be colored because the individual is
incarcerated, see note 10 supra.
31. The importance of a decision which deprives a person of his liberty is one of the major
reasons that the Constitution provides for the right to counsel in federal and state criminal
proceedings. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
463 (1938). See also In re W., 5 Cal. 3d 296,486 P.2d _ 96 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971) ("... interests
involved in civil commitment proceedings are no less fundamental than those in criminal
proceedings and that liberty is no less precious because forfeited in a civil proceeding [rather than
criminal]") Kadish at 337-41 (State interest in effective hearing outweighs administration
objection). But see MODEL PENAL CODE § 305.7 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) ("a prisoner shall
be permitted to advise with with . . . counsel, on for a hearing [not present] before the Board of
Parole.") (Emphasis added).
32. The Model Penal Code lists eighteen states: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Idaho,
Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, Utah and Washington. MODEL PENAL CODE § 305.10,
comment at 88 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
33. Although the states listed allow counsel, this may not be direct evidence of the effect of
having to provide counsel in all cases. Two inferences could be drawn, either the effect of providing
counsel is not great or the necessity of providing counsel has not been judicially tested and such
assistance not provided. See also Sklar, Law and Practice in Probation and Parole Revocation
Hearings, 55 J. CRIM. L. C. & P.S. 175 (1964) (parole revocation hearings). A governmental interest
in administrative burden is legitimate and has been found sufficiently important to outweigh
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be drawn from this information, however, since no empirical data is
available which indicates the frequency or the manner in which this right
is exercised. Nonetheless, studies clearly show that states have a large
volume of parole release hearings.u The argument that assistance of
counsel at these hearings would be followed by demands for the full
panoply of procedural rights is difficult to refute. The same is true for
the argument that the allowance of this full panoply would clog the
calendars of the Parole Boards. The critical issue, therefore, is whether
these demands would be granted by the Parole Board or the courts. In
this regard courts have consistently held that the nature of the
proceeding will dictate the extent of counsel's participation. The typical
position was stated in Fleming v. Tate:35
The presence of counsel does not mean that he may take over control
of the proceedings. . .[t]he participation by counsel in a proceeding...
need be not greater than is necessary to insure, to the Board as well as
to the parolee, that the Board is accurately informed. . . . [T]he presence
of counsel is meant as a measure of protection to the prisoner; it should
not be permitted to become a measure of embarrassment to the tribunal.'6
A strong argument can be made to support the proposition that
appointment of counsel for indigent prisoners would be required by the
equal protection clause.3 7 There is, however, case law which might
suggest a contrary result. In civil cases, placing burdens on the poor is
not necessarily violative of the equal protection clause. The Supreme
Court in James v. Valtierra8 stated ". . . of course a lawmaking
procedure that 'disadvantages' a particular group does not always deny
equal protection. ' 39 Similarly in Goldberg v. Kelly40 the Court recently
otherwise constitutionally protected interests. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)
(adverse administrative effects on selective service system sufficiently important to justify conviction
for draft card burning as symbol of protest).
34. 430 F.2d at 409-10.
35. 156 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
36. Id. at 849.
It should be noted that this case involved parole revocation not release. Such a setting
involves more of a guilt determining decision than do release hearings; right to counsel,
therefore, might be more strongly urged. See generally 54 IOWA L. REv. 497, 507-09 (1968).
37. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355-56 (1963) (If state provides appellate review and
an individual who retains counsel has an advantage, state must provide counsel for indigents).
See also Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967)(must provide counsel for indigent at probation
revocation hearing); Earnest v. Willingham, 406 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1969).
38. 91 S.Ct. 1331 (1971) (requirement for referendums for low income housing not violative
of equal protection clause).
39. Id. at 1334.
40. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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stated: "We do not say that counsel must be provided at [a welfare
revocation] . . . hearing, but only that the [party] must be allowed to
retain an attorney if he so desires". 4' The critical issue, therefore, may
be whether parole release hearings are considered criminal in nature or
are classified as civil or administrative. Although these cases do not
require a conclusion that assistance of retained counsel should be
allowed at parole release hearings, they do suggest that the concern over
potential mandatory appointment of counsel for indigent prisoners need
not necessarily foreclose the retention of counsel by others.
B. The Impact of Mempa v. Rhay42
In an attempt to place parole release hearings in a context permitting
assistance of counsel, the petitioner claimed that parole release
proceedings were an extension of the sentencing process. His argument
was based upon the proposition that parole release hearings are
"essentially a continuation of sentencing 3 and, "at sentencing he would
have been entitled to assistance of retained counsel". 44
The majority distinguished sentencing and parole release on the
ground that "the prisoner's sentence has already been finally decreed
by the court and cannot be changed." 4 In support of the petitioner's
contention, the dissent gave substantial weight to the increased use of
indeterminate sentencing as a means of dividing the responsibility of
sentencing between the judge and the parole board. 41 The dissent also
pointed out that for the prisoner the "stakes" were the same:
imprisonment for some period-followed by return to society.
The majority and the dissent both relied heavily on Mempa v. Rhay.41
41. Id. at 270-7 1. [Although the Goldberg decision talks in terms of "means to live", it should
be kept in mind this was a civil, not a criminal, proceeding. This distinction may be crucial to
the Court's speaking in like manner in a Parole proceeding].
42. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
43. 430 F.2d at 410.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. In line with this trend of dividing responsibility, the prisoner in Menechino was sentenced
to an indeterminate term by the judge, and after serving one year became eligible for parole at
the discretion of the state Board of Parole. 430 F.2d at 414.
See also Senate Report on bill 18 U.S.C. § 4208: ". . . would permit the court, at its discretion,
to share with the executive branch the responsibility for determining how long a prisoner should
actually serve." S. REP. No. 2013, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) U.S. CODE CONG. ADM. NEWS,
3891, 3892; TASK FORCE REPORT ON CORRECTIONS, PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
86 (1967) (Parole legislation involves essentially a delegation of sentencing power to the parole
board). 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201,4208 (Supp. 1971); N.Y. Penal L. § 70.40 (MeKinney 1967).
47. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
[Vol. 1971:502
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In Mempa the Supreme Court held that an indigent petitioner has a
constitutional right to appointed counsel at a proceeding "whether it
be labeled a revocation of probation or a deferred sentence." 48 Since
the petitioner in Mempa was originally released on probation without
a sentence being imposed, the revocation proceedings resulted in the
initial imposition of sentence. The Menechino majority supported its
distinction between parole release proceeding and revocation of
probation or a deferred sentence on the grounds that in Mempa legal
rights could have been waived at the subsequent sentencing. This
interpretation was based upon the Supreme Court's statement in Mempa
that:
Even more important in a case such as this is the fact that certain legal
rights may be lost if not exercised at this stage. For one, Washington
law provides that an appeal in a case involving a plea of guilty followed
by probation can only be taken after sentence is imposed following
revocation of probation. . . Therefore in a case where an accused agreed
to plead guilty, although he had a valid defense, because he was offered
probation absence of counsel at the imposition of the deferred sentence
might well result in loss of the right to appeal. 41
The dissent, however, found the controlling factor in Mempa to be
the requirement that the judge impose the maximum sentence and then
make recommendations on the period of imprisonment. 50 In Mempa the
Supreme Court stated:
Obviously to the extent such recommendations are influential in
determining the resulting sentence, the necessity for the aid of counsel
in marshalling facts, introducing evidence of mitigating circumstances
and in general aiding and assisting the defendant to present his case as
to sentence is apparent. 5'
The dissent in Menechino suggested that this language indicated that
counsel is required at "all sentencing proceedings and that 'sentencing'
is not confined to what a judge first proscribes after trial. 52
48. 389 U.S. at 137.
49. Id. at 135-36; see also Cohen, Sentencing, Probation, and the Rehabilitative Ideal: The View
from Mempa v. Rhay, 47 TEx. L. REv. 1 (1968).
50. Statute required judge to sentence person to maximum term provided by law, with actual
determination of length of time to be served to be made by Board of Prison Terms and Paroles,
389 U.S. at 135.
51. Id.
52. 430 F.2d at 417. For an application of Mempd v. Rhay in an even more extreme case, see
Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd in part sub nom, Sostre v.
McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971). The court held that a prisoner who was placed in solitary
Vol. 1971:502]
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The conflicting views as to the basis of the decision in Mempa"3 must
be examined in light of Townsend v. Burke.54 In Mempa the Court
quoting in part from Townsend stated:
In 1948 this court held in Townsend v. Burke . . .that the absence of
counsel during sentencing after a plea of guilty coupled with
"assumptions concerning his criminal record which were materially
untrue" deprived the defendant in that case of due process. Mr. Justice
Jackson there stated in conclusion: "In this case, counsel might not have
changed the sentence but he could have taken steps to see that the
conviction and sentence were not predicated on misinformation or
misreading of court records, a requirement of fair play which absence
of counsel withheld from this prisoner."
If counsel's role in Townsend is viewed as protection of a legal right,
as is suggested by the Menechino majority's interpretation of Mempa,
the conclusion that the traditional skills of counsel are not required at
parole release hearings seems substantially weakened. For if a right was
to be protected by counsel in Townsend, the case suggests that it was
the right to fair play,5" including at least the prevention of the use of
materially untrue assumptions in determining the sentence. Even the
majority in Menechino accepted the view that counsel could assist in
parole release hearings by protecting "against Board decisions based
on misinformation or lack of adequate information."-7 Regardless of
the absence of factual issues at a parole proceeding, therefore, Townsend
confinement for more than a year was "in effect" sentenced and therefore entitled to: (1) written
notice of charge; (2) hearing with right of cross-examination and calling of witnesses; (3) written
record of hearing; and (4) retention of counsel or a counsel substitute. Id. at 872.
53. Compare Hewett v. North Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1969); State v. Alkinson, 172
S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1970); Exparte Fuller, 435 S.W.2d 515 (Texas 1969) with Williams v. Patterson,
389 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1968); Holder v. United States, 285 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. Tex. 1968); State
v. Phillips, 443 S.W.2d 139 (Mo. 1969). See also Cohen, Sentencing, Probation, and the
Rehabilitative Ideal: The View from Mempa v. Rhay, 47 TEx. L. REv. 1 (1968); 56 IOWA L.
REv. 199 (1970).
54. 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
55. 389 U.S. at 133.
56. It seems the Parole Board's immediate goal should be at least a fair, complete and adequate
hearing. See generally N.Y. CORR. L. §§ 210, 211, 214(4) (McKinney 1968). See also extensive
criteria for parole eligibility in MODEL PENAL CODE § 305.10 (Proposed Official Draft 1962),
including, "(8) such other relevant information concerning the prisoner as may be reasonably
available"; 56 IOWA L. Rev. 199, 205 (1970)(state also has interest in fair hearing); 54 IOWA L.
REv. 497, 502, 507 (1968); Hewett v. North Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316, 1322-23 (4th Cir. 1969);
cf. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966).
57. 430 F.2d at 408 n. 2. "There appears to be little dispute, for instance, that such a
representative could sometimes assist the board by obtaining and presenting additional relevant
evidence, such as facts with respect to the prisoner's employment prospects, family and community
[Vol. 1971:502
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suggests that preventing use of misinformation is at least a traditional
role of counsel.
Conclusion
The Menechino court based its decision on the questionable right-
privilege dichotomy as well as a narrow view of the traditional role of
counsel. Such a position tends to ignore the element of "fair play"
required in governmental hearings and constitutionally mandated when
a person's liberty is at stake. The heavy loads placed upon Parole Boards
and the tendency toward summary parole release hearing, coupled with
virtually complete discretion of the Parole Boards indicate a need for
at least some safeguard to assure that standards of "fair play" are
maintained.58 Assistance of retained counsel has long been recognized
as one means of assuring "fair play".
In addition, viewing sentencing as merely a declaration from the bench
which can not be changed, 5' ignores a sentence's most critical
aspect-the period of incarceration"0 which is not fixed and can be
changed. 61 This together with current sentencing practices,62 would seem
life, and could protect against Board decisions based on misinformation or lack of adequate
information. Usually the inmate is a person of limited education. Furthermore he is unlikely
because of nervous tension to be able to express himself as logically to the Board as he might in
a different setting."
58. According to the majority the Annual Report of the New York Division of Parole for the
year of 1967 evidenced more than 11,000 interviews annually. 430 F.2d at 409-10. See also REPORTS
OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS [1969], 156-
64, 284-92; TASK FORCE REPORT ON CORRECTION, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT 186-190 (1967); Dawson, The Decision to Grant or Deny Parole: A Study of Parole
Criteria in Law and Practice, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 243,299-300; Tappan, Role of Counsel in Parole
Matters, 3 PRAC. LAWYER 21, 26 (1957); cf. Sklar, Law and Practice in Probation and Parole
Revocation Hearings, 55 J. CRIM. L. C. & P.S. 174, 186-87 (1964).
59. 430 F.2d at410.
60. Cf. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968). It
is not the sentencing but the possible period of incarceration under a sentence that is the crucial
factor in determining whether a trial by jury is constitutionally mandated.
61. 430 F.2d at 410.
62. See note 46 supra and 430 F.2d at 414. ("In New York, the standards in making that
determination [whether prisoner entitled to freedom] are remarkably similar. Indeed the Correction
Law of the State of New York refers to the Board's role in a parole release proceeding as a 'judicial
function'. If the functions of judge and Parole Board under these arrangements are viewed
objectively, the parole release proceeding in New York, as elsewhere, does seem in practical effect
to be an extension of the sentencing process".' Citing N.Y. PEN. L. §§ 65.00, 65.05 (McKinney
1967), N.Y. CORR. L. §§ 212, 213 (McKinney, 1968). See also Note, Due Process: The Right
to Counsel in Parole Hearing, 54 IOWA L. REV. 497, 505 (1968).
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to support an argument that parole proceedings are an extension of the
sentencing process.63 If this position is maintained, Mempa may support
a finding that retained counsel can not be barred from parole hearings."
63. The New York statute provides that after serving his minimum time the prisoner comes
under the jurisdiction of the Board of Parole. Also once released on parole the Board has authority
to terminate the prisoner's sentence. Thus it could be argued that upon serving the minimum time
the prisoner's sentence enters a new phase: one that is not fixed, and one that can be changed.
During this phase parole release would be a critical element in a possible termination of the
prisoner's sentence, i.e. sentencing process. N.Y. CORR. L. § 220 (McKinney, 1968).
64. There may at the same time, however, be internal inconsistencies in this position. If Mempa
is to be used to require allowance of retained counsel, it must be remembered that Mempa actually
mandated appointment of counsel to indigents at a parole revocation hearing. This could work
at cross purposes with the position that just because retained counsel is allowed, appointed counsel
[and thus an intolerable administrative burden] would not necessarily follow.
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